Introduction
The introduction of explicit diagnostic criteria and rule-based classifications, such as Research Diagnostic Criteria (RDC), 1 Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM), Ed 3 and Ed 4, 2,3 has dramatically influenced teaching and research psychiatric practice. More precise diagnostic criteria and semistructured and structured diagnostic interviews have become the norm in research. Teaching is now based on the DSM system, a system that has become de-facto, a worldwide common language. However, it is increasingly clear that the diagnostic concepts enshrined in DSM classifications of mental disorders need to be revisited and adapted as new information on genetic and other factors emerge. This is as true of psychiatry as it is for other medical disciplines.
Concept of disease
Disease is a fluid concept. 4 It is influenced by societal political and research attitudes that change with time and in response to new scientific trends. One can see the change in the Diagnostic Classification System for Mental Disorders as psychiatry evolved from an analytic to an atheoretical perspective. For practical purposes, disease is generally considered to be an attribute of a patient and a patient is labeled as suffering from a disease. 4 The major reason for a label is to convey information in short form to others such that it conveys critical information on the nature of the problem. So if someone says that the patient has schizophrenia, everyone else knows what it means.
There are many definitions of disease, but one practical and easily understandable way is to consider 'disease as a state that places individuals at increased risk of adverse consequences'. 4 A particular disease refers to the sum of the abnormal elements such as symptoms, signs, laboratory findings, etc shown by a group by which they differ from the norm (and from other similar conditions) and in such a manner as to place them at risk for adverse consequences. 5 This definition explains the factual implications of the names of diseases when used in diagnostic statements. It relies on comparison with observable norms and therefore avoids circularity in logic. 5 The characteristic or group of characteristics specifying the group of patients should be based on the existing state of knowledge. 5 Norms can in principle be established by an appropriate study of relevant populations, deviations from the norm and consequent risk consequences may or may not need formal statistics. The classification of adverse consequences includes physical morbidity, mortality, but also psychological impairment, activity restrictions and/or role limitations. 5, 6 Most psychiatric diseases place patients at an increased but variable risk for psychological morbidity and only occasionally influence mortality.
Diagnosis is the act of labeling someone as diseased. Diagnosis is the belief that the patient has a disease, a belief that may or may not be true. 4 A single phrase that is the naming of the disease can be used as a short hand for conveying critical information to other clinicians. Advances in knowledge should result in changes in defining characteristics; often these may or may not be reflected in changes in terminology. In the right and rational circumstances, the redefined diseases are unlikely to be identical with the old and they may include some cases not included in the old, and exclude some that were. At this time, psychiatric research is entering a phase when redefinitions are likely to occur and therefore ground rules can be helpful. Explicit ground rules can make the process of 'creating' diseases more transparent.
Nominalist and essentialist
There are essentially two methods of labeling disease, nominalist and essentialist (reductionist). 7 Nominalists label symptoms with a disease name and etiology is not a factor. In the early years of medicine, in general, physicians defined a disease based on a cluster of symptoms. The current approach in psychiatry follows the symptom-and course-based identification of syndromes/disease. In this tradition, the names of diseases are an easy way of stating briefly the assessment of symptoms and signs as well as course. Often they may have gone no farther than recognition of a familiar pattern as is the case for most psychiatric disorders; on some occasions they may have progressed to detection of underlying disorders of structure or of function. The search for causes of this nominally based classification can be elusive. Let us say we find that patients with depression have an abnormal test, say a sleep study. We can use these data and develop it as a test to identify specificity, sensitivity, etc. However, this approach relates the changes to that initial definition. For example, it can lead to a test for that condition but it does not change the definition of that condition based on a presumed cause. Thus, the observations required to test diagnostic statements in disease terminology are diverse. Now, let us say that test is a mutation in a gene and that mutation links to not just depression but to anxiety, bipolar, etc. Then, a purely nominalist approach and using the data as a test for the nominalist disease will be disadvantageous. It is likely to not change practice or improve our understanding that could lead to better identification of subjects and treatments. An example of essentialist identification is staphylococcal infection; here there is no link to symptoms or signs just to the cause. This essentialist concept of disease is not yet applicable in a broad sense to psychiatry because much less is known and causation is likely to be multifactorial.
Defining psychiatric disease in a nominalist tradition
Even though DSM-IV points out that 'there is no assumption that each category of mental disorder is a completely discrete entity with absolute boundaries dividing it from other mental disorders or from no mental disorder' (DSM-IV, p. xxii), 8 the mere fact that a diagnostic concept is listed in an official nomenclature and provided with a precise definition makes it appear discrete. In addition, once concepts are stated they tend to become codified and reified without an examination of the fundamental validity. Robins and Guze 9 proposed formal criteria for establishing the validity of psychiatric diagnoses. They listed five criteria: (1) clinical description (including symptom profiles, demographic characteristics and typical precipitants), (2) laboratory studies (including psychological tests, radiology and postmortem findings), (3) delimitation from other disorders, (4) followup studies (including evidence of diagnostic stability) and (5) family studies. However, few of the more than 300 entities in DSM meet these criteria. As Kendell 10 , Kendell and Gourlay, 11 Kendell and Gourlay, 12 and Kendell and Brockington 13 and others have pointed out, it is likely that the concept of disease in the psychiatric context as a distinct entity may be problematic. One of the hallmarks for symptom-and course-based identification is to demonstrate points of nonoverlap between similar syndromes. The points of rarity or imperfection between psychiatric diseases are not as distinct as one would like. Brief examination of each criteria in relation to existing diagnostic (disease) entities points out major problems in nomenclature. Attempts to demonstrate natural boundaries between related syndromes such as between schizophrenia and bipolar disorder have often not been successful.
14 Although Manton et al, 15 Davidson et al 16 and our group developed a 'grade of membership' model for assigning individuals to diagnostic categories, the model explicitly recognizes that natural classes have fuzzy boundaries and therefore allows individuals to be partly assigned to more than one class. These suggest that points of relative but not complete separation can be identified based on symptoms in the context of depressive disorders, but the significance and boundaries of these definitions remain problematic. Strauss et al 17 showed in a sample of first admissions to a psychiatric unit that symptom clusters representing the classical diagnostic categories, mania, schizophrenia, neurotic depression and psychotic depression could be identified, but only a few patients were closely similar to these traditional syndromes. Strauss et al 17 note 'These findings suggest that although syndromes do exist that fit traditional diagnostic categories, the vast majority of patients fall between these syndromes, having characteristics from several of them'. 17 Another example is that population surveys have also demonstrated that quite minor differences in the definition of individual syndromes, such as major depression, may result in large differences in recorded prevalence, 18, 19 again suggesting that the boundary identified by the definition does not correspond with a natural zone of inflection. Further, no laboratory studies have been forthcoming to validate most of these entities. The effect of these definitions on outcomes has also not been clear. A recent study examining the effect of depression on cardiac outcome in postmyocardial infarction patients supports a continuous role of depression in mortality.
Even depression score above five on the Beck Depression Inventory had an impact. 20 Thus, even the impact of depression on outcome does not have a point of inflection. In addition, as longitudinal data are developed, significant fluctuation in diagnostic stability and change in clinical presentation are seen. For example, anxiety disorders have often been shown to be a prelude to depression. Similarly, there is significant familial and genetic overlap. Several DSM disorders have been found to colocate among the relatives of individuals with schizophrenia, major depression or bipolar affective disorder including substance abuse and panic disorder. Increasing evidence also suggests that several genetic susceptibility loci may be common to more than one nominally clinically distinct disorder. 21 For example, many of the putative susceptibility loci associated with schizophrenia seem also to contribute to the risk of bipolar disorder. 21, 22 The limits of the nominalist tradition have been reached. The fact that few patients meet clean criterion for a formal category and often have 'comorbidity' highlights the problems with the existing system and its tendency to proliferate additional categories without consideration of at least de -minimus notion of points of inflection.
Essentialist tradition
If a disease is defined by characteristics that are more fundamental-for example by a genetic, pathological or molecular abnormality-then it becomes an example of an essentialist classification. A recent example of a newly identified disease is CADASIL. This is a disease associated with a mutation of a gene Notch 3. The mutation leads to a known pathology affecting blood vessels. Individuals carrying the mutation present with strokes, migraine and vascular dementia and occasionally as bipolar disorder and depression. 23 Velocardiofacial syndrome also presents with symptoms suggestive of schizophrenia, bipolar disorder and mental retardation in addition to the characteristic morphological anomalies. The syndrome is due to a microdeletion in chromosome 22. 22, 24 These entities could therefore be diseases in the essentialist tradition. However, research is increasingly supporting the view that many different genes contribute to the etiology of most of psychiatry's major syndromes and that some of these genes are risk factors for what have until now been regarded as unrelated syndromes. 25 As potential genes are identified, defining the level of risk is important because any trait condition or behavior associated with a genetic abnormality is in danger of being construed as disease associated.
A simple idea: patients with a genetic variation who are at minimal or no increased risk for adverse consequences should not be labeled as diseased. 4 If the definition of disease is based solely on a genetic abnormality rather than on a clear specification of the risk, the label may harm the patient. 4 
Alzheimer's disease as an example
Alzheimer's disease (AD) is by far the most common cause of dementia. The presenile form (with onset before age 65) is similar to the most common form of senile dementia. Thus, the basic criteria for AD such as the DSM 8 emphasized the clinical characteristics and the pathology of the disease. However, a dominant pattern of inheritance, more common in presenile cases than in older patients, is well documented and accounts for about one-third of all cases of AD. Evidence that mutations in at least four genes can cause AD has now been generated. They include mutations in the amyloid precursor gene (APP), 26 mutation in a chromosome 14 gene encoding a seven-transmembrane domain protein, presenilin-1 (PSEN1), 27 mutation in a gene on chromosome 1 that encodes a similar 7-transmembrane domain protein, presenilin-2 (PSEN2), 28 and can be associated with the APOE*E4 allele on chromosome 19. 29 Mutations in the APP gene have been associated with an early onset. Some of the mutations link to cerebral amyloidosis of the Dutch type. This group has been called in the Online Mendelian Inheritance in Man (OMIM) system as AD 1. In addition, novel variants have been associated with hemorrhagic strokes, occipital calcifications and arterial dysplasia. AD 3 refers to individuals with presenilin-1 mutations. 30 These individuals have an early-onset disease and many have myoclonic jerks, spastic paresis, early behavioral symptoms, cerebral amyloid angiopathy and unusual plaques. 31 AD 4 refers to individuals with presenilin-2 mutations. These subjects also have early dementia. In some subjects, apathy and depression were early symptoms. 32 AD 2 is related to APO lipoprotein E. APOE*E4 allele has been associated as a risk factor for AD and cardiovascular disease. Unlike PSEN 2 and APP mutations, APOE*E4 allele confers a risk for both sporadic and familial AD and may be better labeled as a risk gene. 29 The observation that the APOE*E4 allele is neither necessary nor sufficient for the expression of AD emphasizes the significance of other environmental or genetic factors that, either in conjunction with APOE*E4 or alone, increase the risk of AD. As potential genes are identified, defining the level of risk is important because any trait, condition or behavior associated with a genetic abnormality is in danger of being construed as disease associated.
It also raises the issue of what criterion should one use in calling an entity secondary to a gene as a disease vs calling the gene as a risk gene. One option would be to consider Kendell's suggestion that if the entity is defined by a fundamental characteristic such as physiological, pathological and/or genetic abnormality, then clear qualitative differences must exist between this entity and other superficially similar conditions. 33 Thus, AD 1, 3 and 4 with an early-onset, additional features, familial pattern, and distinct mutations of specific genes should satisfy this criterion. It should also meet in general terms the Robins and Guze criteria. One should emphasize that the pattern is not entirely the same as described in DSM or other criteria for AD, but has changed based on the additional information acquired as a result of studying these entities. However, AD 2 is less clear. The presence of 1 E4 allele confers risk for AD by about 1-2 times, but the clinical features and pathology are not qualitatively as different from those without E4. In addition, the odds are that most individuals with one E4 allele may not get AD. Thus, the presence of E4 by itself is not diagnostic of general AD or its risk, but it is possible that by combining it with early evidence of memory problems and possible hippocampal volume reductions, it could be construed as a distinct entity that confers a risk for developing AD. It is important to recognize that the need to classify as a distinct entity becomes imperative when a specific treatment decision hinges on it.
Subcortical ischemic depression
The concept of subcortical ischemic depression (SID) and its potential labeling also gives us cause to reflect on the state of labeling psychiatric disorders and the challenges that lie ahead. 42 Any proposal of diagnostic criteria claiming that a psychiatric disorder is due to a medical condition should undergo detailed scrutiny. 34, 35 The concept of vascular depression is not a new idea. Gaupp as noted in Post 36 described 45 elderly patients with depression secondary to arteriosclerosis. Many had persistent apathy and depressed mood. These early findings were based purely on clinical evidence of cerebral vascular lesions, typically strokes. MR and other imaging techniques have allowed depiction of subtle but surprisingly widespread structural brain changes in vivo.
Although our group and others have previously introduced the notion of vascular depression, [37] [38] [39] the broader definition of vascular depression encompasses depression related to both stroke and cardiac disease. SID is analogous to a recent description of subcortical ischemic vascular dementia 40, 41 and is similar to what we previously called MRI-defined vascular depression and SID. 42 Previously proposed diagnostic criteria 43 may be more specific to this entity than the more broadly defined vascular depression. The term, as we defined it, used major depression as the syndrome and subcortical ischemic disease as a variant.
Does this syndrome meet the Robins and Guze definition of validity?
7 SID has a clinical description [42] [43] [44] and can be identified through laboratory studies (MRI), can be delimited from other disorders (by pathology and diagnosed by radiologic examination), is not associated with familial factors for psychiatric disorder and the changes seen on MRI can influence outcomes longitudinally. 44, 45 Subcortical lesions are more common in elderly depressed than control subjects [46] [47] [48] and are more common in late-onset elderly depressed subjects. [47] [48] [49] [50] These patients are also at higher risk of dying and developing dementia. 53 There have also been studies of smaller populations associating new onset of depression with worsening subcortical disease. 54 There may also be a biological gradient, wherein lesions contributing to depression may need to occur in specific regions 55, 56 and worsening of lesion severity is associated with poor depression outcomes. 57 The ischemic nature of these lesions has also been shown. 58 This finding supports data associating severity of subcortical lesions with vascular risk factors such as hypertension, [59] [60] [61] and the development of late-onset depression in the context of hypertension. 62 However, it is important to bear in mind that the concept is broader than just subcortical ischemic major depression. For example, the relationship between depression and subcortical ischemic disease is broader than that defined by DSM criteria for major depression. In community populations, 51, 47 depressive symptoms not just artificially defined criteria for a syndrome like major depression have been related to subcortical ischemic disease. In addition, large prospective studies have shown that subcortical lesions may be associated with persistence or worsening of depressive symptoms over time. 52 In this context, SID should be envisioned as part of a continuum of neuropsychiatric conditions associated with subcortical ischemic disease. 63 This general concept is in the essentialist tradition, subcortical ischemic disease becomes the defining characteristic just like coronary artery disease and the manifestations of the disease could include depression. Mood disturbances associated with subcortical ischemic disease may include the full criteria for major depression, bipolar disorder or dysrthymia. In addition, less severe or chronic mood disturbances are likely to be associated with subcortical ischemia; however, with the exception of minor depression, our current diagnostic nomenclature does not well capture these other disturbances. Other manifestations of SID include MCI, dementia, falls and psychoses. 64 Genes and environment in the development of disease concepts Environmental factors have been considered in the development of disease concepts in psychiatry. The classic example is post-traumatic disorder (PTSD). 65 In this case, the defining characteristic is trauma. However, in this case, a complete vetting of the consequences of trauma is not considered, but only certain elements directly relating to the trauma.
Another characteristic that should be given similar consideration is childhood maltreatment. There is emerging data that maltreatment is a risk for depression that appears to be different in pathophysiology treatment response and even in course.
The negative outcomes associated with child maltreatment include increased aggression, social withdrawal, depression, low self-esteem 66 and poor school performance. 67 Again, this could begin to be delineated as a separate category of disease. A research definition of such an entity could provoke a reinvigorated interest in this area.
Although many children suffer long-term consequences of abuse and neglect, only some children seem to develop adverse consequences. Maltreated children with a genotype conferring high levels of MAOA expression were less likely to develop antisocial problems. 68 A functional polymorphism in the promoter region of the serotonin transporter gene is a short allele found to moderate the influence of stressful life events on depression. 69 Individuals with one or two copies of the short allele of the polymorphism exhibited more depressive symptoms in relation to stressful life events than individuals homozygous for the long allele. 69 The question is, does the genotype go into the definition of disease, and is this premature at this time? It clearly points to a direction of research that can go into defining an entity.
Criteria for defining disease
The first and obvious criterion is that the condition should be one that leads to a risk for adverse outcomes, either mortality or functional impairment.
The second is where an identifiable characteristic environmental factor, pathology or genetic factors can be clearly defined; that characteristic should separate the entity on at least one of the following criteria from similar entities: clinical symptoms, course and outcome, familial pattern and, treatment response.
The differentiation should be meaningful, not just statistical, but clinically significant. This will depend on the particular variable with some probably getting more weight than others, such as qualitatively new symptoms, mortality, etc being more important than minor changes on age of onset or frequency of a particular symptom. Clinical significance may have to be adjudicated by collective groups. This remains in the eye of the beholder, but as a minimum there is no clinical significance without statistical significance. Failure to separate may change over time as additional information is developed and may go through a stage where the characteristic is considered as a subentity.
Third, where no identifiable characteristic such as pathology or genetic factors can be clearly defined and the defining feature is therefore nominalistic; then these nominalist features should separate from similar entities on at least one of the following:
1. course and outcome, 2. familial pattern, 3. treatment response.
The definition should not be circular, that is using course as a characteristic in the description of the symptom. If course is used, then the entity should differentiate on one of the other options. Nonoverlapping symptoms alone on top of symptoms of a neighboring entity either cross-sectional or longitudinally should not define the entity. If it does, it leads to the same nominalistic tradition that currently exists. This should be applied at least for proposed new entities but should be also evaluated in the context of existing entities during the revision process for the current DSM manual. This process may provide more insight. An interesting issue is whether some of the nosology of mental health can be dissociated from its social context.
